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Private Conservation Easements:  
Balancing Private Initiative and  
the Public Interest
Gerald Korngold
T   he last quarter of the twentieth century was marked by a historic so-cial movement embracing environmental protection and the preservation of natural habitats and species. While environmentalism in America has 
roots extending to at least the nineteenth century, it exploded as a popular phe-
nomenon beginning with Earth Day in 1969. Today it is a pervasive ethos. To 
name a few examples, environmental values are reflected in legislation, regula-
tion, and enforcement on the federal, state, and local levels; in the business mod-
els of corporations, both global and local, where they are typically expressed as 
“sustainability”; in the products marketed and consumed by Americans; in the 
education programs of our schools; and in many religious institutions, reflecting 
an ethical and moral orientation. 
While government has played a vital role in defining and implementing en-
vironmental policy, the nonprofit sector has developed and executed significant 
and innovative environmental protection programs. These accomplishments go 
beyond the important role of nonprofits in education and advocacy for natural 
protection. Rather, nonprofits have acquired, managed, and otherwise utilized 
private property rights to achieve conservation goals. 
The development and implementation of private conservation easements is 
a prime example of nonprofits’ use of private property rights for environmental 
purposes. A conservation easement gives the nonprofit a perpetual property right 
that prevents the owner of the land subject to the easement from altering its cur-
rent natural condition, thus protecting the present state of the land forever. The 
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conservation easement is private, or privately held, because a nonprofit, rather 
than a governmental entity, owns it.1 
By using conservation easements, nonprofits can use market forces and the 
legal protections of property rights to achieve environmental goals. These private 
initiatives have some key public policy and legal advantages over governmental 
programs. They help to achieve conservation of the natural environment, which 
has become an important national value. They bring the efficiency of free market 
transactions without the costs of government coercion. They represent the free 
choice of the landowners, which should be respected absent a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. 
This chapter shows that private conservation easements provide a valuable 
property rights approach to land preservation and that they deserve continued 
recognition and validation. However, private conservation easements raise public 
policy and legal concerns relating to the significant tax subsidies accompanying 
them; the threat to democratic principles and quality decision making of having 
nonaccountable, nonrepresentative private organizations control local land use 
decisions; the absence of coordinated planning and public process as well as class 
issues in the creation of conservation easements; stewardship lapses by some non-
profits; and a potential lack of flexibility by nonprofits in dealing with emerging 
needs of the community (such as affordable housing and economic development) 
that might conflict with the conservation easement. The chapter examines these 
issues and shows how these concerns can be addressed so that private conserva-
tion easements can be an even more effective tool for achieving environmental 
protection through private property rights. 
The chapter first describes conservation easements, their attributes, and ex-
isting data. It then examines the various life stages of a conservation easement— 
creation, stewardship, and potential modification and termination—to develop 
the competing public policy and legal perspectives as well as suggested solutions. 
Conservation Easements: Attributes and Data   
William H. Whyte (1959) popularized, if not coined, the phrase “conservation 
easement” in the late 1950s. Generally, conservation easements prevent the 
owner of the land burdened by the easement from changing the natural, ecologi-
cal, open, or scenic attributes of the property. Conservation easement documents 
1. Government also can hold conservation easements. See DePalma (008); Sabine River Au-
thority v. U.S., 745 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Tex. 1990), affirmed, 951 F.d 669 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(federal Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service); Mira Mar Mobile Community 
v. City of Oceanside, 119 Cal. App. 4th 477 (004) (city); Ohm (000). 
. For a definition of a conservation easement, see Uniform Conservation Easement Act 
§ 1(1). 
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often contain a general statement of such conservation goals and the agreement 
of the subject owner to not engage in actions that would violate this purpose 
(Glass v. Commissioner, 471 F.3d 698 [6th Cir. 006]). Sophisticated conserva-
tion easement documents also include a list of specific proscribed activities, such 
as cutting timber, constructing additional buildings or roadways, disturbing the 
surface of the land, and displaying signs, among others (Anella and Wright 004, 
61–67). The instruments also may describe retained rights specifically negotiated 
by the burdened owner, such as the right to erect an additional residence (see 
Southbury Land Trust, Inc. v. Andricovich, 59 Conn. App. 785, 757 A.d 163 
[000]). Typically, conservation easements protecting scenic views and natural 
features do not give the public access to the subject property. Rather, the public 
benefit is said to be gained through the support of wildlife or the visual access 
that the public has from outside the property (6 Code of Federal Regulations 
section 1.1701-14[d][3][iii]). 
Whyte and other early proponents of conservation easements extolled their 
benefits.3 The problem was that the common law in virtually all American ju-
risdictions barred the creation of these interests. There were various legal im-
pediments. For example, the law permitted nearby neighbors to own veto powers 
only over the development of a parcel of land (the common law prohibition 
of “in gross” restrictions), while supporters of conservation easements felt that 
the nonprofits should not have to own land close to the easement property and 
could be out-of-state organizations. There were questions at common law about 
the transferability of easements in gross, making it difficult for one nonprofit to 
assign a conservation easement to another. Additionally, the common law bias 
against perpetual restrictions on land ran counter to the prescribed model of un-
limited duration for conservation easements. 
Statutory validation—required as a separate enactment within each of the 50 
states, as real property law is a state, not a federal, matter—was therefore nec-
essary to implement the conservation easement vehicle. This legislative process 
culminated with the development of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act in 
1981 and its subsequent adoption in over 0 states. The Uniform Act recognized 
perpetual conservation easements as valid property interests and specifically re-
moved common law hurdles. The remaining states passed similar legislation over 
the last decades of the twentieth century. The result is that conservation ease-
ments are now recognized as valid, enforceable property interests. 
Data on the number and acreage of conservation easements are limited. (This 
in and of itself raises a public policy concern, as discussed below.) Only fragmen-
tary data can be teased out, but they reveal both significant absolute numbers of 
conservation easements and percentage growth. In 005 the Land Trust Alliance 
reported that American local and state land trusts held conservation easements 
3. For other early boosters, see Brenneman (1967) and Cunningham (1968). For a history of 
the land trust movement and its work on conservation easements, see Brewer (003). 
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on over 6. million acres, a 148 percent increase from the 000 figure of .5 mil-
lion (Land Trust Alliance 005a). The Nature Conservancy held over  million 
acres under conservation easement (in addition to acreage held by land trusts) in 
008 (Nature Conservancy 008). Combined, these holdings approach the 9 mil-
lion acre range, and they do not include the many conservation easements held 
by other nonprofits. Joan Youngman (006) has provided a useful comparison 
to provide a sense of the magnitude of this land area: 9 million acres is roughly 
equivalent to the aggregated size of Rhode Island, Delaware, Connecticut, and 
Hawaii. Table 14.1 shows the not insignificant percentages of total land in a ran-
dom sampling of states subject to conservation easement held by land trusts only, 
as of 005.
The following sections examine conservation easements from a public policy 
and legal perspective, presenting the benefits and disadvantages of these interests 
and offering legislative and judicial proposals to address the public policy short-
comings. The chapter follows these issues over the various stages in the evolution 
of a conservation easement, from creation to the operational phase to the chal-
lenges of possible modification or termination. Conservation easements uniquely 
serve important public policy goals and deserve continued validation and en-
forcement by legislatures and courts. At the same time, however, some changes 
in the structure and process of conservation easements would better ensure a role 
for the public, a more efficient use of public resources, enhanced conservation 
results, and the injection of flexibility to respond to changing social, economic, 
Table 14.1 
Conservation Easement Acreage Held by Land Trusts in Sample States, 2005
State Total Conservation  
Easement Acreage
Total Land Acreage 
Within State
Percentage of State Land 
Under Conservation Easement
Maine 1,492,279 22,646,400 6.58
Vermont 399,861 6,152,960 6.49
Maryland 191,330 7,940,480 2.40
New Hampshire 133,836 5,984,000 2.23
Virginia 365,335 27,375,360 1.33
Colorado 849,825 66,620,160 1.27
Massachusetts 61,569 6,755,200 0.91
New York 191,095 34,915,840 0.54
Arizona 35,645 72,958,720 0.04
Iowa 6,000 36,014,080 0.01
Source: Land Trust Alliance (2005a, chart 5); U.S. Census Bureau (2006, table E-1) (using a factor of 640 acres per square mile to 
convert area figures).
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and technological needs. This can ensure that these important property rights 
will continue to serve both current and future generations. 
Acquisition of Conservation Easements   
Many of the benefits of conservation easements are manifest in the acquisition 
stage. First, their creation serves the growing conservation value in the United 
States. Over the past four decades, Americans’ attitudes toward our lands and 
environment have undergone a major evolution. Land is now prized for its natu-
ral and historical features, not only for its full-development potential (Kuzmiak 
1991). Conservation easements are an important preservation vehicle, useful in 
balancing development and conservation considerations.  
Moreover, private conservation easements are nongovernmental initiatives. 
Direct acquisition costs of conservation easements are borne by nonprofits, rather 
than by local, state, or federal government, although there may be tax subsidies, 
as discussed below (Byers and Ponte 005, 9–10; Raymond 007, 16–0). This 
relieves government from the burden of spending limited resources on conserva-
tion activities. Given other pressing needs, the pressures of special interests in the 
development sector, and the need to preserve the tax base, government may not 
be as willing to purchase and safeguard conservation easements as is a nonprofit 
that is free from such forces. 
Third, the law’s validation of private conservation easements creates effi-
ciency advantages in land markets. The law has typically allowed parties to sell 
partial interests in land, such as leases, since those free market exchanges achieve 
an efficient allocation of limited (and nonrenewable) land resources. By allowing 
conservation easements, the nonprofit can purchase only the restriction and need 
not buy the right to occupy the property, which the burdened land owner is glad 
to retain. If we did not allow conservation easements, conservation organizations 
would have to purchase fee interests in land in order to conserve it, spending far 
more money than the cost of the easement, decreasing the reach of its conserva-
tion purchasing power, and needlessly forcing the landowner to sell complete 
(possessory) rights in the property. The cost of an easement in a property is far 
less than a fee (Coughlin and Plaut 1978). Given the cost-effectiveness of ease-
ments, it is not surprising that easement acquisition by nonprofits has increased 
at a far greater rate than fees, as seen in figure 14.1.
Additionally, state and local governments obtain fiscal benefits when a non-
profit acquires an easement rather than a fee. When a nonprofit holds a fee for 
conservation purposes, the entire fee value is exempt from property taxation. 
With an easement, the value for property taxation is reduced, but a taxable value 
remains, so the municipality still collects some tax revenue.4 
4. For an example of a statute requiring reduced real property assessment because of the pres-
ence of a conservation easement, see Indiana Code § 3-3-5-8. 
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Fifth, while public land use regulation (zoning) provides an opportunity for 
more comprehensive conservation programs within a community and region, 
such regulation may come with significant costs. Zoning proposals often lead 
to bitter and divisive battles among landowners, winners, and losers and to ex-
pensive, and perhaps winning, challenges by disgruntled owners.5 A consensual 
vehicle like a conservation easement avoids the ill will and legal challenges of a 
coerced regulation. 
Finally, freedom of choice is an important part of ownership (Ely 1998, 17). 
If a landowner wishes to donate or sell a conservation easement, the law should 
uphold this preference, overriding it only in truly rare situations with compelling 
reasons. 
ConCerns
Despite the benefits of conservation easements, there are concerns. Although di-
rect acquisition consideration is paid by the nonprofit, there may be a significant 
tax subsidy on the federal, state, and local levels. Section 170(h) of the Internal 
Revenue Code permits federal income tax deductions for conservation easements 
donated to qualified nonprofit organizations. These tax benefits do not apply if 
the easement is sold for fair market value consideration. The availability of tax 
benefits are referenced (some may say advertised or promoted) by nonprofits 
extolling or seeking conservation easement donations (see Nature Conservancy 
5. On the topic of zoning in general, see Fischel (001). 
Figure 14.1 
Increase in Acquisitions by Land Trusts, 2000–2005 
Source: Land Trust Alliance (2005a, chart 5). 
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008). In what has become a key driver for setting the duration of conservation 
easements, the Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction only if the easement is 
created in perpetuity. Without such a requirement, one might expect to see ease-
ments for a term of years or leases of conservation rights that prevent develop-
ment for a limited term. 
The federal tax subsidy is significant. In tax year 003, federal income tax de-
ductions for conservation and historic easements equaled $1.49 billion. Assuming 
that high-income taxpayers made the donations, the revenue loss to the Treasury 
would be roughly in the $600 million range. As shown in table 14., conserva-
tion easements were a much larger percentage of the total amount of deduc-
tions for noncash property donations in 003 (4 percent) than of the number of 
donations (0.01 percent).
The average amount of a conservation easement donation is three times 
higher than the average amount of the next highest donation, as set out in table 
14.3. This supports the inference that conservation easements provide tax ben-
efits primarily for those in higher income brackets and with higher net worth. 
Abuses in conservation easement deductions have also led to Treasury losses. 
Common areas of abuse are dubious appraisals and insider deals.6 According to 
recent reports, the IRS has found that deductions on 96 of 108 Colorado conser-
vation easements are sufficiently defective for back taxes to be owed by donors.7 
A conservation easement also lowers the valuation of the burdened property for 
estate tax purposes, reducing the estate and thus the tax liability (6 Code of 
Federal Regulations 5.703-1[a][4]). This creates an additional federal Trea-
sury loss. 
Some states grant state income tax deductions for conservation easements, 
either by special provisions or by paralleling the federal structure. Colorado, for 
example, has gone even further, providing for a tax credit of 50 percent of the 
6. See U.S. Senate Finance Committee (005) (on abuses) and Pension Protection Act of 006, 
9 U.S.C.A. § 119 (recent regulation attempting to address appraisal problems). 
7. See Migoya (007) (18 cases still under investigation). 
Table 14.2 
Individual Noncash Charitable Contributions for Easements, 2003 
Type Number of  
Donations
Percentage of  
Total Donations
Amount to Schedule A Percentage of Total 
Deductions
All 14,273,171 100 $36,902,794,000 100
Easements 2,407 0.01 $1,491,924,000 4.0
Source: Wilson and Strudler (2006, figure A).
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easement’s value up to a maximum of $375,000. The Colorado credit is transfer-
able for consideration to other taxpayers or tradable to the state for a refund if 
the state treasury has a surplus (see Colorado Statutes Annotated § 39--5). 
This has yielded an $85.1 million revenue loss in 005, up from a modest $.3 
million in 001 (State Tax Notes 007). Widespread abuses have been cited in 
the Colorado program (Smith and Hubbard 008). 
Local and state property tax revenues are decreased by placing a conserva-
tion easement on a property. Assessments for property tax purposes must ac-
count for restrictions on the land. So when a conservation easement prevents 
development, the land’s value is lowered and tax revenues are thus decreased.8 
This raises an important public policy concern, since the municipality is now 
faced with the choice of cutting services or increasing taxes on other residents 
(Anderson and King 004). An individual’s decision to place a conservation ease-
ment and maximize personal welfare can have a negative effect on the town’s 
civic agenda and on other citizens. 
In addition, the acquisition stage of conservation easements may not always 
further true conservation goals and may also frustrate the public land use pro-
cess. Nonprofits have virtually unconstrained discretion in accepting donations 
8. See Gibson v. Gleason, 0 A.D.3d 63, 798 N.Y.S.d 541 9 (005), upholding the decrease 
of valuation due to conservation easement. There are no good data supporting the suggestion 
that the conservation easement will increase the value of neighboring properties, offsetting the 
tax loss (Youngman 006, 753). 
Table 14.3 
Individual Noncash Charitable Contributions, 2003
Type of Contribution
 
Average Amount  
Per Donation
Easements $619,727
Real estate $201,112
Other investments $158,903
Mutual funds $43,889
Corporate stock $34,279
Art and collectibles $6,282
Clothing $878
Household items $808
Average amount, all donations 
(including those not shown)
$2,585
Not all types of noncash charitable contributions are shown.
Source: Wilson and Strudler (2006, figure A).
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of conservation easements and in purchasing them. Some conservation organi-
zations may simply take any easements that come their way, often initiated by 
taxpayers seeking tax benefits, even though the easements do not advance a 
meaningful conservation agenda. Some national organizations have promulgated 
well-conceived best practices for nonprofit easement acquisition, but they are 
nonbinding.9 Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code does not clearly re-
quire a significant benefit in exchange for the deduction. For example, a deduc-
tion for an open space easement is given if the public has no more than a view of 
part of the property. The code and regulations fail to specify the extent of what 
the public must be able to see (for example, is a view of one of one hundred 
acres sufficient?) and how the view actually will benefit the public (6 Code of 
Federal Regulations § 1.170A-14[d][3], [4][ii][B]). Moreover, public access is not 
required, and is rarely granted, for the donor to receive a deduction for a conser-
vation easement to protect habitat or preserve open space. 
Nonprofits do not acquire conservation easements pursuant to a public land 
use plan. This conflicts with several important public policy goals. Without an 
overall plan, the result can be a checkerboard of easements that do not yield an 
effective, community-wide preservation plan. The whole might be less than the 
sum of the parts. This atomized approach conflicts with modern planning theory 
and practice, which favors broader community, regional, and cross-border solu-
tions to land issues. At least one study reports that “local trusts specializing in 
providing open space do not consider the impact of their decisions on regional 
conservation benefits” (Albers and Ando 003, 31). 
Even high-functioning nonprofits with good acquisition practices are operat-
ing as private entities. They are not subject to the accountability of the electoral 
and regulatory processes that motivate and constrain public officials. Outsourcing 
local land use decisions—separating them from public, democratic governmental 
processes—raises serious concerns that will multiply as more conservation ease-
ments are acquired by private groups. The situation is exacerbated by the ability 
of geographically distant nonprofits, with less stake in the local community than 
the people living there, to hold conservation easements in gross and possibly hold 
key decision-making powers. 
A recently reported controversy illustrates how a conservation easement 
might be acquired by a distant nonprofit in a manner that frustrates local con-
cerns. The San Francisco Chronicle reported that the secretive Bohemian Club, 
comprising leaders in industry, government, and entertainment, sought to engage 
in logging on its ,600-acre redwood grove in Northern California. To reduce 
its redwood holdings below ,500 acres, which would allow the club to use a 
streamlined permit process for logging, the club offered to donate a conserva-
tion easement on 160 acres to the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation of Missoula, 
9. See Byers and Ponte (005, 6–4) for an example of best practices. 
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Montana. Local protest was strong, with one local owner calling the proposed 
donation “at best . . . a cynical use of a conservation easement” (Kay 008). 
Spinning off conservation decisions to private organizations through private 
conservation easements may serve the goals of local public decision makers. If 
officials fear negative reactions about conservation decisions they make or fail to 
make from segments of the electorate or interest groups, delegation seems to be 
an attractive opportunity. The citizens deserve better. 
The unrepresentative, undemocratic nature of private conservation acquisi-
tions is heightened by the potential for class issues and elitism in conservation 
nonprofits. William H. Whyte (1959, 37), the so-called progenitor of conserva-
tion easements, warned of the “muted class and economic conflicts” inherent in 
these interests: 
Characteristically, the gentry have a strong bias for the “natural” country-
side, and it is the preservation of this that the easement device promises. 
When they think of open space, they usually don’t think of parks, or lakes 
for recreation, or the landscaping along superhighways; they think of 
farmland, streams and meadows, white fences, and barns.
Conservation easements, which typically limit large tracts of land to 
a single private home, have the effect of private large-lot zoning that ex-
cludes denser, moderate-income housing. 
These potential class inclinations are exacerbated if the board of directors 
making acquisition and other decisions is unrepresentative, parochial, homog-
enous, and self-perpetuating. This is too often the case with the composition 
and the governance pattern of nonprofits (Korngold 005, 138–14), though 
increased diversity has been urged (Land Trust Alliance 005b, standard 3B). 
People’s rights to freely associate should be protected. That does not mean, 
though, that control over public land use policy should be delegated to the pri-
vate associations. 
A final problem arising in the acquisition stage of private conservation ease-
ments has been referred to earlier: the data on conservation easements are limited 
and difficult to extract. In all but a few states, no separate index or set of record-
ing books for conservation easements exists. Thus, while a title searcher can and 
will find a conservation easement recorded against a specific property, there is no 
way to see and thus aggregate the total number of conservation easements that 
have been recorded throughout the county and state. 
The absence of data is a significant public policy concern. Elected officials, 
planners, and citizens have no clear idea of the number of conservation ease-
ments, the total acreage, the identity of the nonprofit holders, the scope of the 
restrictions, and the pattern of easements created on and across the ground of 
the political subdivision and neighboring communities. It is difficult for govern-
ment to assess environmental needs and to develop a public land use and con-
servation policy and plan without knowing even basic information about private 
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conservation easements in the community. Any possibility of leveraging public 
and private conservation assets requires transparency about the extent of hold-
ings. Moreover, potential market players cannot get an overall view of existing 
conservation easements in the area. 
solutions
Adjustments to the legal rules related to the acquisition of private conservation 
easements can help to address the concerns that have been raised and, at the same 
time, make private conservation easements an even more effective vehicle. These 
adjustments will ensure better conservation results in return for the tax subsidies 
provided through the federal income tax deduction; help to encourage a greater 
role for the public land use process in the acquisition of private easements by 
adjusting the current incentive structure, with the additional benefit of mitigating 
potential class issues to an extent; and provide data for public decision makers 
and the market. 
The key to achieving these advances is altering the tax subsidy of Internal 
Revenue Code section 170(h). Property owners should be free to do whatever 
they want with their property, including donating conservation easements to 
nonprofit organizations. This chapter does not propose infringing on this im-
portant freedom. The public, however, should not have to pay for the dona-
tions—indeed, encourage them—via tax incentives unless they provide significant 
and desired public benefits. Currently section 170(h) does not clearly require ad-
equate public benefits from donors of open space and natural habitat easements 
in exchange for deductions, and it also frustrates public planning. 
The code and regulations provide much detail on deductible open space and 
natural habitat easement, but the requirements do not clearly set a high enough 
bar for public benefit. An open space easement must only provide for “the sce-
nic enjoyment of the general public.” No specific amount of property must be 
viewable, and the regulations’ definition of “scenic enjoyment” uses vague, pli-
able language (6 Code of Federal Regulations § 1.170A-14[d][4][ii]). Habitat 
easements are similarly defined in broad terms, and cases indicate that taxpayers 
sometimes have different views about what is ecologically significant than do the 
IRS and wildlife experts (Glass v. Commissioner). Whether the public is getting 
what it is paying for via the deductions for open space and habitat easements 
remains unclear. 
In contrast, a deduction for the donation of an easement preserving histori-
cally important land areas or structures is available only if there is prior gov-
ernmental process and approval of the easement (§ 170[h][4][A][iv]). Claimed 
historic land must be listed in the National Register, and a building must either 
be listed in the National Register or be part of a registered historic district and 
certified by the secretary of the interior as having historic significance (6 Code 
of Federal Regulations §§ 60.4, 67.4). The National Register process involves 
standards, administrative action, and public voice, and the Secretary of the In-
terior has promulgated standards for historic districts. Governmental decision 
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makers, the process, and articulated standards help to ensure that deductions are 
granted for historically significant properties only. The public gets a benefit in 
exchange for the tax subsidy, and the taxpayer is not making a unilateral decision 
about the scenic or ecological benefit of the conservation easement. 
Therefore, the code should be amended to permit a federal tax deduction for 
an open space or habitat conservation easement only if there is prior local, state, 
or federal governmental certification that the easement provides a significant 
public conservation benefit. The certification would have to be consistent with 
a specific governmental conservation plan, and the governmental agency would 
have to approve the particular easement on the specific parcel. Although state 
and local government funds would not be paying for the federal tax deduction, 
state and local agencies would be expected to act responsibly in approving ease-
ments because an easement would mean a reduction in state and local property 
tax revenues and because of concern for local land policy. Currently preapprovals 
are not required for federal deductions, so it is hard to see how the federal tax 
subsidy would increase if there were an approval system. 
There are clear benefits to this proposal. First, because only conservation 
easements bringing significant public benefit will be subsidized, public funds via 
federal deductions will be much better spent. The public will be getting value for 
its dollars. Second, by conditioning the deduction on governmental approval, 
donors will have an incentive to engage with the public land use process. Govern-
ment involvement can bring the advantages of planning, process, coordination, 
and leverage of conservation activities. 
While government involvement can bring great benefits, there will be some 
disadvantages. Transaction costs for donors (and government) may make some 
donors hesitate about embarking on the process, but the large benefits of the 
tax deductions are hoped to alleviate this concern. The potentially long delays 
could discourage potential contributors. This could be addressed by the passage 
of a statutory presumption of governmental approval within a certain period of 
time after submission of an application. The experience of Massachusetts, which 
requires state and local governmental approval for the validity (not just deduct-
ibility) of all conservation easements, is encouraging (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 
ch. 184, §§ 31–3). As shown in table 14.1, a significant percentage of Massa-
chusetts land is under conservation easement despite the added requirement of 
governmental approval. 
Property owners will continue to be free to donate conservation easements 
that do not meet the standards of a revised section 170(h). Though such conser-
vation easements will raise concerns about public land use control, this may be 
a moot point. Given the past emphasis on tax deductions in acquisition of dona-
tions, it remains to be seen whether there will be many donations if there is no 
tax benefit. 
The second major public policy concern—the lack of meaningful data about 
conservation easements—can be addressed if all states required and enforced the 
establishment of separate recording books for conservation easements within 
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county recorders offices.10 These records could be maintained, along with other 
land records, in the offices of the recorders of deeds in the various counties in 
the state. The availability of the records would provide policy makers with the 
necessary information to develop a comprehensive conservation plan. It would 
also enhance the operations of conservation and the general market by provid-
ing information about ownership and the nature of restrictions. The costs of 
establishing separate recording books for future conservation easements should 
be minimal: recorders are already absorbing the cost of entering conservation 
easements into existing indexes and record books, and they would only have 
to instead enter the documents into separate registers (just as many recorders 
have separate registers for mortgage instruments). The minimal additional costs 
should be well worth it. 
The Operational Phase   
Strong stewardship of a conservation easement is essential to ensure that its value 
to the public is maintained and tax subsidies are not dissipated. Meaningful stew-
ardship requires periodic inspections and monitoring of the burdened property, 
conversations with the property owner over present or incipient infringements on 
the easement, and legal action to enforce easement violations.
During the operational phase of conservation easements, nongovernmental 
ownership has benefits. The nonprofits, not the government, bear the expense of 
stewarding the easements. An adequately resourced, well-functioning, and effec-
tive nonprofit can do an excellent job, especially if the board and staff members 
and the volunteers are strongly committed to the conservation mission. More-
over, a dedicated nonprofit has the advantage of being free from political interest 
group pressures and able to raise philanthropic dollars to fund necessary stew-
ardship. 
ConCerns 
There are concerns with easement stewardship by some nonprofits. While many 
do a fine job, others fail to inspect, enforce, or even keep track of the easements 
they own (see Pidot 005, 18–19; U.S. Senate Finance Committee 005, part 
two, –4). Poorly funded, inadequately governed nonprofits often lack the finan-
cial and organizational capital to get the job done. 
solutions 
Some steps may help to enhance nonprofit stewardship, but their effectiveness 
will have to be tested with longitudinal studies. The Land Trust Alliance has 
developed a voluntary program of accreditation for land trusts and detailed stan-
10. Only a few states have adopted such requirements. One that has is California. See Cal. 
Govt. Code Ann. § 755(). 
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dards and practices. It remains to be seen whether low-functioning nonprofits 
will enroll and succeed in this process and whether the standards are adequately 
drafted to get at the elusive governance issues that prove daunting for nonprofits. 
Moreover, this is a voluntary program; nonprofits can hold easements without 
certification. It is unclear whether donors substantially motivated by tax benefits 
will pay attention to certification. 
The most effective answer may be through the power of the attorneys gen-
eral of the various states to represent the public in the matter of charitable gifts, 
trusts, and organizations. An attorney general could bring an action to enforce 
a conservation easement when a nonprofit fails to do so. She could challenge 
the nonprofit’s right to continue to hold the easement if the public interest is 
not being served.11 She could also bring, or merely threaten, breach of fiduciary 
duty actions against board members of nonprofits that have not performed up to 
standards—a powerful incentive for board members to take notice and exercise 
their legal authority over operations. 
Limited resources are a significant impediment to increased attorney gen-
eral activity. Attorneys general are sworn to enforce a myriad of laws, many 
with more immediate impact on a large number of people than the enforcement 
of conservation easements. Conservation easement enforcement might go to the 
end of the line. One possible solution is the imposition of a special recording fee 
for conservation easements. The fees could be placed in a sequestered fund for 
employing and supporting state attorney general personnel in enforcing conser-
vation easements. 
Change and Flexibility   
Change is inevitable. Over time there will be new advances and emerging chal-
lenges in economic and social circumstances, technology, politics, and the envi-
ronment. In rare situations, some changes may raise questions about whether a 
specific conservation easement should be modified or even terminated to serve a 
greater public interest. For example, due to environmental changes or develop-
ment in surrounding properties, an open space or habitat easement may no longer 
bring significant conservation benefits. Conservation biologists and ecologists are 
wondering how currently preserved lands will change with the climate. In the 
words of Healy Hamilton, director of the California Academy of Sciences, “[w]e 
have over a 100-year investment nationally in a large suite of protected areas that 
may no longer protect the ecosystems for which they were formed” (Dean 008). 
Other public concerns, such as the need to build affordable housing or to spur 
economic development in a severely depressed area, may override conservation in 
rare circumstances in the future. How will privately held conservation easements 
stand up to these conflicting forces?
11. On the topic of attorneys general power, see Brody (1998). 
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Benefits 
Recognizing conservation easement as a protected perpetual property right brings 
certain benefits when the environment is under pressure. Often development 
pressures have run roughshod over public land use regulation, compromising 
conservation goals, perhaps without thoughtful consideration of alternative de-
velopment plans that would have been more environmentally friendly. Once an 
area has been developed, it is hard, if not impossible, to “unring the bell” and 
restore the land to its natural condition. A conservation easement in the hands of 
a nonprofit is a powerful, property-based restriction on development, free from 
the vagaries of the political process. 
ConCerns 
The lack of flexibility in perpetual easements can present serious concerns in rare 
circumstances in which countervailing public needs require an adjustment to or 
perhaps even termination of a conservation easement. The law of conservation 
easements has decreased flexibility for several reasons. 
First, conservation easements are not really easements; they are covenants in 
that they place negative restrictions on the burdened land (preventing changes in 
the natural features). This is not a matter of semantics. Easements are generally 
enforced by the courts without question and are viewed as valuable and valid prop-
erty rights. Covenants, on the other hand, are traditionally viewed with distrust by 
the law. The courts have been concerned that restrictions on land reduce market-
ability by creating multiple ties that increase transaction costs when a sale or financ-
ing is sought. More important, the courts have questioned certain attempts in past 
generations to use covenants to impose their wishes on the autonomy of current 
owners of property. The policy lessons of covenant law apply to conservation ease-
ments, and calling them easements does not make the policy issue disappear.1 
The perpetual nature of conservation easements presents a threat if an ease-
ment is rigidly enforced in the rare circumstances in which unusual public re-
quirements call for flexibility. At a future time, land subject to a conservation 
easement may be the only viable locus for economic development in a depressed 
area, for the construction of low-income housing, or for some other pressing 
social need that we cannot imagine today. Because the conservation easement is 
privately held, the decision on its modification or termination will be made by the 
nonprofit, perhaps from a distance. Local citizens will not be able to work out 
the balance between conservation and other public necessities in a democratic, 
public, local land use process. Rather, a nonaccountable private organization will 
be making the decision.
Market forces will unlikely be sufficient to motivate nonprofits to be flexible. 
Conservation organizations are driven by conservation values and rarely, if ever, 
enter into market exchanges to sell or release their conservation easements. They 
1. On the issue of covenants versus easements, see Korngold (004). 
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may doubt their power to engage in such transactions under their governing docu-
ments, fear losing their nonprofit status if they do so, and need to assure potential 
donors that the organization can be trusted to adequately preserve property.
Inflexibility and nonprofit control over modification and termination deci-
sions have serious public policy ramifications. Key local land decisions have been 
moved from the public arena to the private sector, violating essential principles of 
local democratic control. Class differences and elitist notions may influence the 
nonprofit’s decision about the necessity of additional employment opportunities 
or affordable housing, not necessarily because of ill will but rather because of a 
limited worldview. Moreover, perpetual conservation easements, no matter how 
well meaning and how beneficial they are in the vast majority of cases, can in 
rare situations violate the autonomy of future generations. Land has played an 
essential role in American economic, social, and political life. It is a limited and 
nonrenewable resource. Future citizens should be grateful to today’s nonprofits 
and owners for their conservation efforts, but the price must not be surrendering 
the ability of future generations to make important land use decisions based on 
future values, requirements, and trade-offs. The current generation must allow 
for adequate flexibility and not require perpetual fealty to conservation in all 
cases. Intergenerational responsibility requires a balance between conservation 
values, current citizens, and the autonomy of future generations. 
solutions 
A number of steps can be taken to inject flexibility into conservation easements to 
help to achieve public policy goals. First, the holder of a conservation easement 
has the power to agree to consensual modifications and even termination of the 
interest.13 Nonprofit board members may hesitate to modify or terminate con-
servation easements out of fear of breaching their fiduciary duty of obedience to 
the nonprofit’s mission or of infringing on its tax-exempt status. Senator Charles 
Grassley is quoted as saying that “modifying these [conservation] easements is a 
huge no-no” (Black and Flynn 005); such statements can chill the willingness of 
volunteer trustees to act. Nonprofit law needs to be clarified to provide that fealty 
to an overall mission of conservation in the public interest is not violated by com-
promises with respect to one parcel. Good directors insurance and opinion letters 
from lawyers would also embolden boards to accomplish the public interest. 
Second, courts can be more aggressive in applying traditional covenant mod-
ification and termination doctrines to conservation easements. For example, they 
could use the rule prohibiting the enforcement of covenants violating public pol-
icy to strike the very rare conservation easement that interferes with overriding 
public values and goals. This doctrine has been applied in the past, for example, 
to permit the establishment of group homes for the disabled despite restrictions 
limiting occupancy to single families (Korngold 004, § 10.0). A disadvantage 
13. For advice to land trusts on this issue, see Land Trust Alliance (007). 
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of using this rule is that when a covenant is struck for public policy, no compen-
sation is paid to the covenant owner. Thus, a conservation organization would 
not receive funds to buy a replacement conservation easement. Unless the courts 
were creative and invented a theory that justified the rewarding of compensation, 
striking covenants for violations of public policy would not adequately accom-
modate important conservation values. 
The doctrine of relative hardship allows courts to enforce a covenant by 
imposing monetary damages rather than the typical injunction (Korngold 004, 
§ 11.08). The doctrine is applied when the costs to the parties and the public 
from an injunction will be too great compared to the benefits that the injunction 
will bring. When a court applies the relative hardship doctrine, it is, in essence, 
requiring a forced buyout of the covenant, giving the covenant owner money but 
not enforcing the covenant as a property right. This doctrine, which is employed 
judiciously because it rearranges the agreement of the parties, could be applied 
in the rare case in which public needs are great and the conservation value of 
enforcement is comparatively low. The conservation organization would receive 
monetary damages and could reinvest in conservation easements on other prop-
erties. There is little case law setting out the measure of damages in relative hard-
ship cases (see Restatement of the Law of Property 000, § 8.3[1]; Korngold 
004, § 11.08). Governmental takings may serve as a model. As discussed below, 
courts have focused on the increase of value to the formerly burdened parcel 
when a gross servitude is terminated. 
The Third Restatement of Property, a key reform agent in the field of servi-
tudes, has recommended that the court should adjust the particular conservation 
purpose to allow continuance of an overall conservation purpose when condi-
tions have changed so that the particular purpose of a conservation easement can 
no longer be accomplished (Restatement of the Law of Property 000, § 7.11). 
This modification will take place pursuant to the doctrine of cy pres, which re-
quires a judicial hearing and approval. Since the public is the true beneficiary of a 
charitable gift, the cy pres process ensures that the nonprofit is truly representing 
the public’s interest in the modification proceeding.14 
Cy pres provides procedural protections by requiring the state attorney gen-
eral to represent the public’s interest and substantive benefits by preventing valu-
able conservation easements from disappearing. The requirement of a cy pres 
proceeding for modifications may deter a nonprofit board from making the usual 
discretionary decisions that do not require formal modifications out of fear of li-
ability or criticism.15 This will likely decrease flexibility in conservation easement 
stewardship, something that is necessary for a viable relationship of easement and 
14. On cy pres in conservation easements, see McLaughlin (005). 
15. Statutes, such as Maine’s, that require prior judicial approval and participation of the at-
torney general before amendment of a conservation easement have similar positive effects and 
costs. 33 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. § 477-A.
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nonprofit with burdened owner over the perpetual term of the easement. The costs 
of legal representation in cy pres judicial proceedings will tax the limited resources 
of nonprofits, making them unwilling to engage in modifications necessary for the 
public interest and diverting key funds when they are forced to do so. 
Third, the legislative power of eminent domain can provide a key way to 
eliminate conservation easements in the future when the public interest requires. 
Eminent domain has long been the tool by which government appropriates land 
from an individual, for compensation, to serve communal needs. It is an essential 
tool given the efficiency of communal infrastructure, changing land use needs 
over time, and the challenge of the monopoly-type power that holdouts wield. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London, 546 U.S. 469 (005), 
held that eminent domain can be exercised under the Constitution for the pur-
poses of economic development pursuant to a clearly conceived municipal plan. 
The plan in Kelo was necessary to revitalize the city’s battered economy and in-
volved some 90 acres. Pursuant to the redevelopment, offices, hotels, recreation 
areas, and public spaces were to be built. The Court held that this was a legiti-
mate public use under the Constitution even though some of the property would 
end up in the hands of private developers. Under the Court’s conceptualization, it 
would be possible to take a conservation easement by eminent domain as part of 
a necessary economic redevelopment. Compensation would be paid to the non-
profit, presumably to be reinvested (pursuant to the board’s fiduciary obligation) 
in other conservation easements. Kelo’s lesson would allow flexibility for future 
generations with respect to easements while maintaining conservation values. 
When a servitude in gross is taken by government, compensation must be de-
termined. If commercial easements are taken, such as easements granting the right 
to erect and maintain billboards, income streams can be projected and discounted 
so the court can arrive at their value (see State ex rel. Missouri Highways and 
Transportation Commission v. Muslet, 13 S.W.3d 96 [Mo. App.] [006]). With 
a conservation easement, the calculation is different because a negative rather than 
an affirmative interest is involved; value is harder to calculate because of the lack 
of a commercial income stream. When an appurtenant servitude is taken, the dam-
ages can be seen as the decrease of the value of the benefited parcel by comparing 
the value of that parcel with and without the servitude. With a negative in gross 
restrictions such as a conservation easement, the court may have to use a damages 
measure based on the difference in the value of the burdened property with and 
without the servitude (Korngold 004, 475). As applied to conservation easements, 
that measure would capture the gain to the burdened owner by the release of ease-
ment. It would not measure the subjective value that the conservation organization 
attributed to the conservation easement that was lost by the taking. As the law 
prefers objective to subjective measures, this may be where matters are left. 
Kelo ignited a storm of protest from commentators, state legislatures, and 
state courts. Many legislatures have passed laws barring takings for economic 
development. Courts have found that while such takings are permissible under 
the federal Constitution, state constitutional provisions bar eminent domain for 
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economic development. These judicial and legislative pronouncements are ill 
advised as a general matter, condemning future generations to the land use ar-
rangements of the past. With respect to conservation easements, they prevent the 
flexibility needed to balance conservation values and future needs. 
Conclusions   
Private conservation easements serve important public policy values, achieving 
conservation of the natural environment through the use of property rights. The 
law should continue to recognize and validate these important interests. Private 
conservation easements, however, come with costs. They are created without over-
all land use planning and public participation. Stewardship may be inadequate. 
The easements and the nonprofits holding them may be insufficiently flexible to 
balance competing public needs. By addressing these concerns, we can create even 
more effective and valuable private conservation easements that will benefit fu-
ture generations while respecting their autonomy in an ever-changing world.
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